Clerics, Capital, and Confusion: Marxists Misfire on Iran

New Appendix: 'International Viewpoint' on Iran

May 18, 2025

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 posed complex challenges for international socialist organisations, including the Fourth International. While the International Executive Committee (IEC) of the Fourth International issued statements expressing solidarity with the Iranian people's struggle against the Shah's regime and imperialism, deep-seated theoretical and political differences among affiliated groups led to divergent analyses and strategies, ultimately creating confusion about the Fourth International's overall stance. At the heart of these differences lay contrasting interpretations of the revolution's character, the role of the clerical leadership, and the applicability of the strategy of permanent revolution.

International Viewpoint and other publications that reflected the views of the Fourth International presented a view that defended the Iranian revolution as a powerful mass movement with significant anti-imperialist potential. The IEC supported the struggle of the workers and peasants, as well as the oppressed Kurdish people, against repression and for self-determination, seeing this as integral to the defence of the Iranian revolution. The Workers Unity Party (HVK), a group in Iran affiliated with the Fourth International, adopted theses recognising the overthrow of the Shah, the weakening of imperialism, and the decisive participation of the working class through the formation of shoras (councils). The HVK theses argued that while the existing capitalist government was a "lesser evil" than an imperialist puppet regime, the working class should provide it with material defence against imperialist attacks through independent mass actions, without offering it political support. The ultimate goal was to replace the capitalist government with a workers’ and peasants’ government, building the combat party of the proletariat for this task. Publications like International Viewpoint were critical of the Islamic leadership's repression, co-option of shoras, and suppression of national rights and women, contrasting this with the Bolsheviks' approach. They noted that the fundamentalist leadership's anti-imperialist stance often framed the enemy as the "West" and rejected Western concepts like Marxism.

In contrast, a distinct line emerged from sections like the Socialist Workers Parties (SWP) in the United States, in Australia, and their allies, which critics argued represented a departure from the established revolutionary Marxist programme and the strategy of permanent revolution [see, for example, Ernest Mandel’s Anatomy of a Split, and the Resolution of the Fourth Internationalist Caucus on Iran]. This current, sometimes associated with formulations like a "central anti-imperialist axis" (used by Australian SWP leaders Jim Percy and Doug Lorimer) or "revolution by stages", tended to abstractly elevate the anti-imperialist struggle led by the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) regime above the internal class struggle in Iran.

Critics within the SWP, such as the Fourth Internationalist Caucus, argued that the SWP press, including The Militant and Intercontinental Press, wrongly defined the Khomeini regime as an "anti-imperialist government". They contended this downplayed or denied the counter-revolutionary nature of the regime towards the working class and its organisations, falsely claiming that shoras continued to exist and Trotskyists operated openly in factories. This perspective led to positions such as not defending members of opposition groups, including other leftists, executed by the regime, based on an oversimplification of the conflict.

The SWP leadership, under Jack Barnes, favoured the Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE) led by Babak Zahraie over other Iranian Trotskyist groups. The HKE, particularly after late 1979, embarked on what critics described as an adaptationist course towards "grassroots Islamic currents" and the Khomeini regime. This involved orienting towards Islamic currents, supporting actions like the occupation of universities by Islamic student groups, remaining silent or blaming others regarding the war against the Kurds, and confusing the class divide by praising leaders or endorsing statements of the Islamic Republic. Critics argued this adaptation damaged the revolutionary socialist programme and strategy, undermining the independence of the working class. This divergence in line eventually led to the HKE splitting from the Fourth International.

The presence of these differing analyses and strategies within the Fourth International inevitably contributed to ambiguity regarding its global position. The British section of the Fourth International, the International Marxist Group (IMG), for instance, experienced its own internal debates. These internal discussions partly mirrored the broader international factional differences, including those regarding the Iranian revolution. The IMG’s booklet, Iran: The Unfolding Revolution, articulated a clear position critical of the Pahlavi regime and strongly indicates favour for the working class as the central force driving revolutionary change. However, it does not explicitly use the term "permanent revolution." The very existence of significant international divergences, particularly the SWP's move away from permanent revolution and adaptation to the regime, meant that the overall message emanating from the Fourth International was perceived differently by various groups and individuals worldwide. The fact that a group like Workers Power, closely aware of the IMG, could potentially misunderstand the FI’s position suggests that the complex web of internal debates and divergent public lines made the Fourth International's stance on the Iranian revolution unclear to many.

The struggle within the Fourth International over the analysis of the Iranian revolution reflected fundamental disagreements about how to apply Marxist theory, particularly the strategy of permanent revolution, in complex situations involving anti-imperialist struggles led by non-proletarian forces and repressive regimes. These debates, conducted across various publications and internal documents, highlighted the challenge of maintaining theoretical clarity and political unity in the face of rapidly unfolding revolutionary events.

Appendix

International Viewpoint on Iran

The Fourth International launched International Viewpoint (IV) magazine in 1982 to complement International Press/Inprecor (IP/I), a news magazine produced by the US SWP as a service to the Fourth International. The launch of IV was one of a series of projects that aimed to strengthen the FI, but also gave the FI a more direct voice as IP/I followed the US SWP’s break from Trotskyism. In 1982 and 1983, IV presented a detailed and nuanced understanding of the Iranian revolution and the threats it faced.

Understanding of the Iranian Revolution

International Viewpoint understood the Iranian revolution primarily as a mass mobilisation driven by popular enthusiasm and a desire for change. This mobilisation was capable of achieving significant victories, such as the defeat of the Iraqi army in the second battle of Khorramshahr. The victory was seen as a direct result of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and their willingness to make sacrifices. This mass mobilisation was viewed as the source of the revolution's strength.

The revolution was also understood in the context of the broader anti-imperialist struggle in the Middle East. It was seen as a potential inspiration for masses in other countries in the region, particularly in their struggle against imperialism and Zionism. The Iranian masses' victory was seen as deepening the crisis of neo-colonial rule in the Near East.

However, IV distinguished between the revolution (the mass movement and its potential) and the regime that came to power.

Understanding of the Khomeini Regime

While acknowledging the revolutionary momentum that propelled the regime to power and the mass support for defending the country against the Iraqi invasion, IV was highly critical of the Khomeini regime itself.

The regime was seen as conservative and socially conservative.
It moved against the democratic gains of the revolution almost immediately after the insurrection.
The Shiite clergy are described as having dismantled and broken the factory and neighbourhood committees.
Mass circulation press faced mob attacks directed by the clergy, and massive censorship was imposed, for example, during the first Kurdish war.
Left papers that did not criticize the regime were initially spared, but this changed, evidenced by attacks on the Tudeh party and its publications.
The regime's claims regarding Iraqi support from Kurds and opposition forces were seen as designed to serve their needs of maintaining control over the Iranian masses.
The Khomeini leadership's initial aim was described as a "cold transfer of authority from the old regime to the bourgeois group around the ayatollah".
After the Tehran insurrection, the conservative Khomeini forces were seen as having quickly housebroken the mass organisations, except among minority nationalities with independent leaderships.
The Iranian masses continued to fight for their own economic, social, and democratic demands against the current government's policies.

Different Approaches to the Revolution (and within IV)

The articles in IV primarily present the magazine's unified perspective and the program advocated by its affiliates, rather than detailing internal debates within the FI about the nature of the Iranian revolution itself. However, they do discuss the approaches of different groups involved or commenting on the revolution, and IV's stance towards them.

The Khomeini Regime's Approach: As discussed above, this was seen as aiming for a conservative transfer of power, consolidating state control, and suppressing mass initiatives and democratic gains.
Opposition Groups (Mujahideen, Bani Sadr): IV notes the Mujahideen waged war on the regime as "the new despotism" and that Bani Sadr aligned with them. However, source explicitly rejects the campaign of the Mujahideen for the overthrow of the Khomeini regime, stating it is incorrect to believe that any help for the workers and peasants can come from an alliance with the current represented by Bani Sadr. This indicates IV's strong opposition to this specific counter-revolutionary approach.
Fourth International Affiliates (HKE): The Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE), described as one of the three groups in Iran adhering to the Fourth International, issued slogans calling for a new advance of mass mobilizations, the economic reorganization of the country, and the establishment of the First Workers and Peasants Government in the Near East. This represents the programmatic approach advocated by IV's section in Iran.
International Executive Committee (IEC): The IEC of the Fourth International adopted declarations on the Iran-Iraq war and motions of solidarity against repression in Iran. This indicates the international organisation's stance opposing the regime's repressive actions.

While not presented as an internal debate on the revolution's nature, the sources show a clear position within IV: critical of the regime's repression, supportive of the mass mobilisation against imperialism, and rejecting specific opposition forces while advocating a distinct program for a workers and peasants government.

Understanding of the Threat of Counter-Revolution

The threat of counter-revolution was seen as originating primarily from imperialism, particularly the United States, and its regional allies.

Imperialism was intent on stopping the conflict (Iran-Iraq war) quickly and slowing down the political processes generated by Iraq's defeat, as direct imperialist intervention was seen as a danger.
The US policy was described as hoping Iraq would deal the Iranian revolution crippling blows and that Washington did everything in its power to assure that. The US was seen as having stood behind the invasion from the outset, viewing it as a key front in their battle to crush the revolution.
The principal historic strategy followed by Washington towards revolutions like Iran's is described as seeking to isolate them, wear them out, and promote tendencies within them that are heading in a conservative direction. This involved a "double game".
The defeat of Iraq was considered a disaster for Washington's policy.
Following Iraq's defeat, it was expected that imperialists would step up attacks on other fronts against the revolution, including attempts to topple the current government, continuing the economic boycott, and escalating military aid and cooperation with counter-revolutionary forces.
Imperialism and pro-imperialist regimes were seen as strengthening a counter-revolutionary front aimed against the Iranian revolution, fearing the impact of Iranian advances on class struggle in the region.
Internal counter-revolutionary forces, including monarchist and counter-revolutionary forces, especially in the army, were also identified. Alliances with groups like the Mujahideen represented another facet of forces considered detrimental to the interests of workers and peasants.

In summary, International Viewpoint viewed the Iranian revolution as a powerful mass movement with significant anti-imperialist potential, which needed to be defended. However, it saw the ruling Khomeini regime as conservative and repressive, acting against the revolution's democratic gains and mass organisations. The primary counter-revolutionary threat was perceived as coming from imperialism, employing strategies of isolation, support for conservative forces within Iran, and backing external attacks, though internal counter-revolutionary elements were also recognised.

Discussion about this post

Ready for more?