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Gregor Gall's avatar

At the SWP aggregate at Glasgow Caledonian university in early 2001, which I was present at, the thrust of what the SWP sought to do as the about to be SW Platform was to capture the SSP for its type of politics. This was the bullish charge led by Julie Waterson, one of the SWP Central Committee members, leading the SWP negotiations with the SSP. The previous rivalry with Militant meant the SWP believed it could show itself to be the real revolutionary force and, thus, dominate the SSP. It believed it could show this to be the case by recruiting more members to the SSP (where these new members would be more aligned to SW Platform politics than those of the ISM leadership). Come the split over Sheridan, a conversation with Lindsey German in 2012 in which I argued that the SWP helped Sheridan wreck the SSP, she responded that the SWP Central Committee did not fully know what was going on in Scotland and effectively delegated it decisions on this matter to Waterson and Chris Bambery. Both Waterson and Bambery as Scots were SWP full-timer organisers in Scotland before moving to SWP national HQ in London.

Duncan Chapel's avatar

Phil Hearse's account of João Machado in 1991 captures the bet at its most articulate moment, but it had been made publicly a decade earlier. In 1981, the EM TEMPO collective, the journal associated with what would become Democracia Socialista, published O PT e o Partido Revolucionário no Brasil. It is one of the foundational documents of the FI tendency's strategy in the PT and is worth reading alongside Phil's testimony from the 1991 World Congress.

The 1981 document got the form right and the content wrong, which is the pattern I think recurs across the cases Phil discusses. On form: the PT was correctly identified as a historic break from the cycle of small revolutionary groups, the strategy of dual membership rather than dissolution was correctly argued for, and the rejection of stagism in favour of uninterrupted struggle was right. On content: the document underestimated how readily the PT apparatus could absorb its own internal vanguard, overestimated DS's capacity to win the battle for the party's soul, and treated bureaucratisation as a problem of vigilance rather than as a structural pressure that would intensify as the party moved toward government.

By 2002 and the Letter to the Brazilian People, the question was settled. By 2003 DS faced the choice it had spent two decades preparing for and lost the bet, in Machado's own retrospective formulation.

What strikes me, reading the 1981 text now, is that it contains, in embryo, every analytical resource the FI tendency needed to predict its own defeat. It just could not bring itself to apply those resources to itself. That is the harder lesson the British cases also pose: the bet was right to make, the dissolution was wrong to accept, and the difference between the two depends on whether the revolutionary current can criticise its own trajectory in real time.

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