The Rise of the Independent Socialist Party: Extract from Mandel's Lessons of the German Revolution
First time in English | Extract from Lessons of the German Revolution
[Over three days in 1976, Ernest Mandel lectured on the German revolution. The first part of his comments focused on the working class struggle against Germany’s imperialist war. The original lectures have been translated from French].
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The Independent Socialist Party now became a major mass party. It gained a majority base in the large factories of Berlin and achieved ultra-rapid penetration into most of the country's factories. Revolution was imminent.
A final offensive took place on the Western Front in the spring of 1918, but Germany no longer had the resources to victoriously oppose the Western imperialists after the counter-offensive began. The Western Front collapsed, marking the beginning of the demoralization of the general staff, who were preparing the armistice negotiations.
It was at this point that an incident occurred—a provocation, ignited by the extreme right within the German state apparatus, that set off the powder keg. The chiefs of the fleet, who were the ultras of imperialism, knew that among the armistice conditions the Western imperialists would present to Germany was the intact delivery of the fleet to England. They wanted to avoid this at all costs, as honor was at stake. They prepared for the fleet to leave the port of Kiel to engage in a desperate battle, essentially to sacrifice 80,000 sailors, given the one-to-two balance of power at the time. This fleet would have been massacred, and practically all these sailors would have been killed.
The Kiel Mutiny and its Aftermath
A mutiny broke out on the battleships, starting with a practically proletarian group. The stokers, who were supposed to start the ships, refused to light the fires. The mutineers prevented the fleet from leaving, which, in reality, meant they were benefactors of humanity by saving 80,000 lives, though they were not treated as such. They were immediately treated as mutineers, imprisoned, and sentenced to severe penalties by military tribunals. Some were even sentenced to death.
Street demonstrations ensued, where a detachment of officers—a first in Germany, though it would become a regular occurrence—fired provocatively and idiotically at the crowd, which already included workers from the arsenals and docks mixed with the sailors. This resulted in many deaths, about thirty killed and many wounded.
The reaction was instantaneous: a general strike in the city, mutiny within the city, election of workers' councils, and election of sailors' councils. The city was taken over practically without a fight. The few groups of officers were unable to defend themselves. The entire city garrison sided with the revolution, which took hold by November 3. In the following days, the general insurrection spread to all ports in northern Germany, including Hamburg, Bremen, and smaller cities like Lübeck. The sailors formed a shock group, the famous "red sailors," who would later form a real division called the People's Sailors Division, traveling all over Germany to inform people about what had happened.
The Spread of Revolution and the Fall of the Empire
This acted as a detonator on November 4, leading to widespread insurrection by November 5 in Rostock, November 6 in Bremen, and November 7 in Munich, Dresden, Leipzig, and other cities. The revolution spread throughout most of the country, except for Berlin.
In Berlin, the affair was very well prepared. An organization of "men of revolutionary confidence" controlled all the large factories. They aimed, much like Trotsky in October 1917, to ensure the neutralization or agreement of the soldiers before attempting a trial of strength. This was crucial because Berlin had many more soldiers, and the garrison was ten times stronger than in Leipzig, and they wanted to avoid a global conflict between workers and soldiers. Their project was quite well-prepared, as well-prepared as Petrograd, though it was clandestine, not public. They were well-prepared for penetrating and sounding out the barracks, and for extending their committee networks into the barracks.
The revolution was supposed to take place on November 11. However, another "accident" occurred for the fourth time—a provocation from the right. The former editor-in-chief of the Vorwärts, who had been "stolen" by the right-wing social democratic leadership and later became the main political advisor to the revolutionary confidence men, was arrested on November 8.
The Berlin Uprising
On the night of November 8-9, the delegates in the factories decided to start a general strike the next morning, from four o'clock onwards. The factories quickly stopped, and the strike transformed into an armed insurrection almost without a fight. A huge procession of workers moved radially from the industrial suburbs to the city center. They systematically passed barracks; either soldiers left and joined them, or officers locked soldiers in the barracks out of fear. In such cases, the workers broke down the barracks gates and stormed them from the outside.
Some of Berlin's leading young revolutionary agitators were killed during this time, though not many people perished – only a few dozen deaths, even fewer than in Petrograd's revolution. In a city of 4 million, this was a practically resistance-free triumph of revolution. Unfortunately, among the few dead were some of the most intrepid young revolutionaries who would make serious mistakes in the coming days.
By one o'clock in the afternoon, the victory was secured, formally culminating in the storming of the Emperor's castle. The Emperor was far away, at army headquarters in Belgium, and the police headquarters had already been stormed around three to four o'clock in the afternoon. Scheidemann formally proclaimed the German Socialist Republic at the castle, just minutes after Philipp Scheidemann, a main right-wing Social Democrat leader, proclaimed the German Republic. This was a small, but significant, nuance. The empire collapsed two hours and 35 minutes earlier. A left-wing socialist was appointed head of Berlin's police and armed forces, meaning the Berlin garrison was under the leadership of people who were not only revolutionaries but who proclaimed the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Formally, political and armed power was in the hands of the German working class on the afternoon of November 9.
The Counter-Revolution and the Disarmament of the Workers
The power held by the workers' and soldiers' councils in practically every German city was wrested from them on November 9 or 10, and formally so at a congress. This ordinary congress of workers' and soldiers' councils met on December 16, where two resolutions were presented: one transferring all power to the workers' and soldiers' councils, and a second for the immediate election of a constituent assembly and the transfer of all power to it. The second motion won by two-thirds to one-third. Broadly speaking, the soldiers' councils, which were totally dominated by right-wing social democracy (98% right-wing), tipped the balance in favor of reform, while the workers' councils were split fifty-fifty with a small left-wing majority.
The Social Democrats successfully employed psychological and political trickery. The geographical minutes of the congress are a crucial document to study, as this extremely important operation would be repeated in Spain and in any revolution in a Western European country. One must understand these tricks used by opportunists to dominate such assemblies, above all, to avoid being exploited next time.
While this is the purely formal aspect, it's important to understand that it wasn't decisive. The state is, in the final analysis, a group of armed men, which is even clearer in revolutionary situations than in calm ones. The decision would be made on the ground, not in resolutions. On November 9, 1918, revolutionary soldiers and workers held the weapons in Berlin. The counter-revolution triumphed through two classic means: first, the formation of a counter-revolutionary armed force, and then a trial of strength between this force and the revolutionary force, leading to the disarmament of the workers. This exact process would be seen in Spain. This classic process in proletarian revolutions, even in the 1848 French Revolution and the Paris Commune, fundamentally revolves around the arming and disarming of the lower classes.
There was a series of stages in the disarmament of the workers, which was not easy. For four to eight weeks, the bourgeoisie, not just in Germany but in Europe, was afraid. The first attempts at disarmament failed completely. The bourgeoisie was perhaps mistaken; it is arguable that the famous "People's Sailors Division," representing only 2,000 people, was the organizing center of the armed proletariat. It was, in any case, the best organized part. This division had been stationed in a sector of the castle since November 9, and the bourgeoisie tried to drive them out and disband them.
Initially, they tried negotiation, but the sailors were not deceived. Then, attempts to remove them resulted in a total fiasco. This first setback for the counter-revolution led to considerable radicalization, which, paradoxically, was dangerous because it misled the left about the real balance of power. In reaction to this failed coup, the German revolution witnessed its largest demonstration ever, with over half a million workers and soldiers in Berlin. The Social Democrats could not even speak; they were completely liquidated. The only ones who could speak were the extreme left-wing speakers, who were cheered and cheered, creating a false image for the revolutionaries in Berlin regarding the national balance of power. Even in Berlin, only 10,000 to 15,000 of the 500,000 workers were armed. They had the impression that the entire Berlin proletariat was ready to fight militarily on their side, when in reality, only a small minority was truly prepared for a showdown, though the majority supported them out of sympathy. This encouraged the showdown in January.
The January Uprising and its Repression
The show of force began, rather foolishly, with the revolutionaries taking the offensive by occupying a few newspapers, particularly the Vorwärts, the organ of social democracy. They were besieged in these newspapers by counter-revolutionary forces and driven out with all sorts of deceptions. They were offered an armistice, went out, and were massacred. Repression was organized on a massive scale. The Left was crushed, Rosa Luxemburg and others were assassinated a few days later, and the Spartacists and the Left were hunted down. This was the "bloodbath," a general event. This marked the victory of the institutionalized counter-revolution, with the political liquidation of the organs of dual power and the reconstitution of a bourgeois state. Central power was in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The Social Democrats, who still hoped to have a majority in the constituent assembly at the congress of workers' and soldiers' councils, did not even achieve a bourgeois majority. From an institutional point of view, things were back to normal.
Counter-Revolutionary Tactics and the Kapp Putsch
The counter-revolution's weaponry involved the Social Democrats gathering a force of Freikorps, reactionary officer-soldiers from the most backward regions of the country, around Berlin. Under the leadership of General Fromm, these forces were allowed to enter Berlin in small groups, building up a counter-revolutionary strike force that crushed the revolution in its second, most spectacular and confusing, phase.
Contrary to what revolutionaries and later historiography (including ultra-left and Stalinist) believed, January 1919 was only one of a series of tactical, short-term, and temporary defeats. The first phase of the political counter-revolution ran from November, the day the revolution broke out, to the beginning of the 1920s. It was a coalition of all the country's political forces against the far left. A new cleavage emerged, as the counter-revolution aimed to wipe out not only the far left and the centrists but also the moderate Social Democrats. Political life saw the right and far right opposing the entire labor movement and the social democratic government and president of the republic.
The response was a lightning general strike, the most successful seen in Europe. Immediately, everything stopped: all factories, all public services, water, electricity, gas, public transport, and banks across the country. This was an extraordinarily spectacular general strike based on a total unity of action of the forgotten movement. Here, the role of social democracy's bankruptcy became evident, even to a more moderate layer of workers, leading a new sector to fall into the camp of centrism outside the reformist camp. When people saw that the Social Democrats had collaborated against revolutionaries for two years, and now against revolutionaries who were being "cut [at] the throat," they had to break out.
In parallel, there was the process of forming the Communist Party, a reaction of revolutionaries to the left of the centrist independent social democracy. The Communist Party was formed on December 30 or January 1, 1919, just on the eve of the crushed January insurrection. Its constitution was based on an equivocation, as the true political leader of this party, Rosa Luxemburg's group (the old left democrats), was against the party's foundation at that time, especially with the existing forces, which it believed were ultra-left in their majority.
The Communist Party's Early Struggles
Rosa Luxemburg was also drawn into the January insurgency, which led to disastrous political consequences. After the assassination of the party's main leaders, an ultra-left group dominated the party throughout the first half of 1919, turning it into a small, impotent sect. It refused to participate in elections and unions, becoming totally marginalized. The entire radicalization of the working class at this time went through the independent socialist party, which grew from 100,000 to 300,000 members, and not through the Communist Party. The Communist Party had only about 12,000 or 13,000 members, with a very limited geographical presence in a few large cities. Many large cities had fewer Communist Party members than they have today.
The most conscious elements of the Communist Party, led by Paul Levi and supported by Lenin and Zinoviev internationally, understood that this situation had to change. However, they used rather extremist measures, seeking to provoke a split in the party and exclude the ultra-left. They succeeded at the Heidelberg Congress using methods that were not very clean. The main political resolutions were not voted on, and the vote was extremely divided: 23 mandates against 22, 23 against 21, 23 against 20. The 23 mandates then decided to exclude the 20, effectively half the party.
This had the extremely harmful effect of accentuating the skeletal nature of the party, which in a number of large towns was reduced to 30 or 40 militants, with a broad base only in a few towns in Saxony, especially in Chemnitz, where it was led from. It had a base of several thousand workers there, and also 500-700 workers in Berlin and Hamburg. In these two main cities, 90 percent of the base was on the side of the ultra-leftists. Lenin condemned this split, quite rightly, as he had no sympathy for the ultra-left, and using authoritarian methods was not the way to solve the crisis.
After this, the Communist Party made progress under more flexible leadership, though there were still very serious mistakes, particularly at the time of the Kapp Putsch, by not pursuing a united front policy. The international communists tried to "walk on two legs" or build the party on two rails. They banked on the radicalization of the social left of the independent socialist party, and this bet proved correct.
The Communist Party Becomes a Mass Party
This force became the essential force, meaning the force that provided continuity for the radicalized working class in Germany. It was the force that led, in particular, the left-wing faction of the metalworkers, and it was this force that would transform the German Communist Party into a mass party. Between January and November 1920, the majority of the independent socialist party shifted to a position favorable to the Communist International.
The International Communists did not push for the creation of a secret communist faction within the independent socialist party because they hoped to win a majority, and on paper, they seemed to triumph at the Halle Congress, the famous 1920 Halle Congress. This was a real public confrontation, a titanic debate between the two major currents. The Russians were allowed to come in by the German government in a rather Machiavellian calculation, as the Social Democrats had an interest in weakening the party. This great centrist party allowed the Russians to come and discuss.
Thus, there was a public confrontation—the only one after the October Revolution—between Zinoviev on one hand and the Menshevik leaders on the other, between the right and the international and national left of the workers' movement at this congress. The left triumphed with 60% of the mandates. In principle, something like 400,000 to 500,000 German workers joined the international communist movement and merged with the small German Communist Party to create the unified German Communist Party. On paper, this party had half a million members at the time and was therefore a large mass party.
The vast majority of organized workers in Germany were convinced that capitalism was going to collapse within the next 10 years, and they were even more convinced that war would be one of the essential instruments of that collapse. The criticism of Lenin, Rosa, and the entire socialist left in 1914 was well-founded. At all the international congresses—Copenhagen, Stuttgart, Basel—workers were told: "We must prevent war, and if we cannot prevent it, we must take advantage of it to make revolution". Millions of workers were educated in this spirit. This spirit contradicted the daily reformist practice of social democracy, but both elements were part of the labor movement.
In light of this analysis, what happened afterwards becomes much more understandable. The fundamental class consciousness of these workers transcended reformism and collaboration; for a moment, they were temporarily disoriented and paralyzed. Then, the contradictions of the imperialist war, the worsening economic situation, the crisis of social democracy, and the Russian revolution all helped to bring the revolutionaries of 1917 or 1918 back into orbit. Even if, in terms of numbers and organization, they were perhaps weaker in quite a few European countries than they are today, they were in an infinitely more favorable subjective situation. They had a common language, a common tradition, and common concerns with hundreds of thousands of workers. When Rosa or any small Spartacus militant spoke of the resolution of the Stuttgart War Congress, the Copenhagen Congress, or the Basel Congress against imperialist war, everyone knew what he was talking about. These were resolutions spread in millions of copies in Germany, about which hundreds of thousands of workers had been educated daily by the press, training schools, and so on, within social democracy. There was a common language and tradition, which obviously made things a lot easier.
Rosa Luxemburg's Role and the Mass Strike
[Note: This characterizes Rosa Luxemburg's role in the history of the workers' movement. For Mandel, it is much less the pseudo-spontaneity attributed to her (which is misplaced because she started from a revolutionary organization).]
She was always and built an organization which, in certain respects, was more centralist and even more "bureaucratic" than the Bolshevik party (her clandestine party in Poland). But her main role in the workers' movement was an extremely brilliant, prophetic, and in reality, more lucid role than that of Lenin and Trotsky at that time: it was her struggle for the mass strike.
What she understood more by instinct than by in-depth theoretical analysis was that after the cunning revolution of 1905, a mutation was necessary for the international workers' movement. A new epoch was about to begin—an epoch, as the mines would call it, of revolutions of war and counter-revolution. The international workers' movement needed a new practice to prepare itself for this new epoch and these new tasks, and without this new practice, it would be incapable of facing this new epoch. The logic applies 100%: a mass workers' movement, irrespective of the level of consciousness of workers who only have the practice of electoral campaigns and economic strikes, will be de facto disarmed before the stage of a historical epoch of revolution, counter-revolution, and war. The mass strike campaign could have created this bridge between the period of peaceful, gradual expansion up to the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the period of revolutions, counter-revolutions, and wars that began in 1914. Rosa Luxemburg understood this.
By mobilizing workers in extra-parliamentary political struggles, by educating them in a systematic confrontation with the state apparatus, they could learn the kind of struggle that became necessary from 1914 onwards. It is probably a tragedy of the international workers' movement and of the entire history of the twentieth century that this struggle for the mass strike did not break through. The campaign had enormous success, with meetings of seven, eight, nine, or ten thousand workers in many German towns, and some big demonstrations. The campaign for universal suffrage in Prussia was beginning to move in the direction of a mass political strike. But it stopped fairly quickly; the social democrats, the apparatus, and the union were afraid, and the experience was not sustained.
People reproached her for not having built a Bolshevik party in Germany, as some conceived it. If Rosa had done that before 1914, it would have been a ridiculous adventure. It would have formed a tiny group of perhaps 200 members without the shock of 1914 and the shock of the 1918 revolution. The vast majority of the German working class was not ready to break away on a purely ideological basis from a party they had built up over 35 years of effort and in which they believed very deeply. What was needed was a profound historical experience, a betrayal on a historical scale, rather than an ideological quarrel like those that took place before 1914, to justify such a break in their eyes. Only afterwards, when the working class experienced a mass centrist party and its futility, did the communist alternative appear to be a truly credible alternative.
Earlier, the development of the famous Berlin metalworkers' "men of confidence" was described. These groups, after being created in Berlin, began to spread, with difficulty, under conditions of military censorship and dictatorship, but nevertheless began to spread nationally. What were these men of confidence, and what is a political vanguard? They were not revolutionary Marxists in the sense we designate them today. Rather, they were truly the vanguard, the broad workers' guard in the real sense of the term, or to use another more dangerous term, but one close to the same concept: they were the natural leaders of the class. In other words, they were those who reflected, not continuously, but dynamically, through initiative, what the masses could understand at a given stage. They were truly the mediators between the mass as it is and objective necessity, playing an essentially positive role with the best intentions in the world.
Most of them ended up joining the Communist Party and the International Communist Movement three years behind schedule, in 1920 instead of 1918. They would not stay for long, but that was less their fault than the fault of the Communist Party. This leads to the core question: why the Communist Party failed to capture these elements in 1918-1919 and why it succeeded in 1920-1922. These are historical causes, related to people's relations, organizations, and tactics.