What approach could have unified the IMG in the early 1970s?
Bitter factional struggles reflects different values. Was there a road to unity?
Reading through the International Marxist Group’s extensive internal discussions in 1972 and 1973, a more nuanced understanding of revolutionary crisis, consciousness, and the party's role and a more balanced approach to theory and practice could have achieved a synthesis of differing viewpoints.
Key differences in approach were present within the IMG.
A 'propaganda-centred' approach can be seen as more focused on the need for ideological purity, with the belief that correct theory is a precondition for effective action.
A ‘materialist’ approach, by contrast, was more focused on the need to engage with the working class in struggle, with the belief that consciousness is raised through practical activity, and is linked to material circumstances.
These different viewpoints applied to various issues, from the nature of the vanguard and the role of trade unions to government slogans and the relationship with other groups. The core distinction lies in the propaganda-centred view prioritising ideological correctness and abstract theory, while the materialist approach emphasised practical engagement with the working class in real struggles as the primary way to raise consciousness.
It is also worth bearing in mind that these were not two simple sides of an argument and many within the organisation held views that could be considered a mixture of both.
Revolutionary Crisis
Instead of counterposing revolutionary and non-revolutionary crises, a synthesis could have acknowledged that mass mobilisation can occur around both revolutionary and non-revolutionary slogans. The key lies in understanding the specific conditions and adapting tactics accordingly. A unified approach would recognise the need to fight for leadership in mass struggles, regardless of whether the situation is a preparatory or open revolutionary period.
Consciousness
Rather than collapsing consciousness into cognition or focusing solely on the structure of bourgeois power, a synthesis could have integrated the importance of memory, history, and theory in shaping consciousness. This would bridge the gap between those who emphasised active engagement with circumstances and those who stressed the importance of "ideas in the head". Such an approach would recognise that individuals within the broad vanguard (syndicalists, social-democrats, Stalinists and sectarians as well as revolutionists) all possess a more or less scientific consciousness, a theory which they carry into practice and can be induced to question.
Role of the Party
A synthesis could have moved beyond the rigid separation of propaganda and participation in struggles. The party's role should be to actively engage in struggles while also providing a strategic framework and programmatic positions relevant to workers. It should avoid both "spontaneist worship of the masses" and underestimation of the political possibilities contained in mass struggles.
Theoretical Practice
Instead of prioritising either theory or pragmatism, a synthesis could have recognised the intertwined nature of both. While practical errors often stem from theoretical errors, they also reinforce one another. The party should test its theories through experimental activity and be willing to adjust its course based on the results.
The Transitional Programme
A synthesis would require recognition of the importance of the Transitional Programme, while also understanding that its specific form must be adapted to concrete circumstances. Rather than simply spelling out general characteristics, the party must attempt to formulate a concrete programme based on analysis of the past and present, thinking for the future.
Factionalism and Internal Democracy
A synthesis requires an understanding that unity in action, the constant struggle of groupings in discussion, the duty to report and the maximum spread of information, theoretical education and discussion within the organisation, testing in practice and balance sheets of lines, and a conscious approach to our own history and traditions theoretically underpin the norms of organisation.
A reader asks: "in 1968 it was invited to join IS in order to build a united revolutionary organisation. Was there anything so bad about the IS which prevented the IMG fusing into it?"
In the spring of 1968, the International Socialists (IS, now today's Socialist Workers Party) launched what they called a "unity offensive". Their proposal was for all revolutionary groups to join IS based on four points, so liberal that even Labour MPs like Stan Newens agreed with them. From our perspective, and the later experience of Workers' Fight, the primary aim of this initiative by IS was to try and eliminate competitor organisations before we truly gathered momentum. They particularly targeted individuals, largely students, who had been active in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) and felt drawn to the IMG due to our leading role in that crucial struggle. IS even went so far as to claim that there was space for IMG sympathisers within their ranks because the IMG was "probably going to join IS anyway". This presented a challenging situation.
While some saw entry into IS as an "attractive proposition", reminiscent of the American Trotskyists joining the U.S. Socialist Party before the Second World War, the IMG leadership ultimately decided against it.
Several significant concerns and criticisms regarding IS contributed to this decision. Comrades felt that the political price of joining IS would be too high. Even at that stage in 1968, IS's opportunist and somewhat chaotic line was becoming clear (something they later attempted to rationalise).
IS showed a distinct "lack of interest" in the Fourth International, viewing it dismissively as having "capitulated" to Stalinism. Later, more educated members of IS would specifically use "anti-Pabloism" rhetoric against us, arguing that our ties to the FI made us a "petty-bourgeois student-based group" incapable of building in the workers' movement. This fundamental difference in our relationship to the world revolutionary movement and international organisation was a major barrier.
The IMG also observed opportunism in IS's approach to solidarity work, particularly concerning the Indo-Chinese revolution. Although they eventually came out in support of the NLF in 1967, after there was a downturn in activity in this field, IS mostly withdrew totally from VSC activities once they had recruited members. Their political approaches often seemed inconsistent; for instance, some saw politics emerging spontaneously from the shop stewards' movement, while their "democratic centralism" often appeared more as a superficial internal system than a deeply understood political principle. They even announced that theory was not important in their drive for new members.
The experiences of other groups like Workers Fight, who did have closer engagements with them, seem to affirm the correctness of our decision at that time. It would have dragged the IMG into internal debates with people who were even further from us politically than the RSL, with whom the IMG had gone through a miserable experience.