A footnote that sets a trap
Writing Alan Thornett’s obituary earlier this year reminded me of someone else’s obituary of another long-time leader of the Fourth International in Britain. In April 1997 Workers’ Liberty published the second part of Patrick Avaakum’s life of Bob Pennington, under the title “Bob Pennington and the Trotskyist archipelago“. It is an angry, often funny and essentially unfair obituary of a militant who spent his life in a movement Avaakum thought had gone wrong from the start. At one point he says that the cadres of the post-war Trotskyist groups were trained less in Marxism than in “Jesuitical interpretations” of a world that kept refusing to fit their dogmas. To show what he means, he drops a footnote. It asks the reader to solve a conundrum.
The conundrum runs like this. Nationalised and collectivised property makes China a workers’ state. The Chinese Communist Party that created it was essentially peasant in composition. How can it be shown, as it must be, because only a workers’ party could do what has been done, that it was “really” a workers’ party?
The trap is in three premises. The first is that nationalised property makes a workers’ state. The second is that the CCP was a peasant party. The third is that only a workers’ party could have made the overturn. Hold all three and you are forced into exactly the sophistry Avaakum is mocking: proving that a peasant army was “really” proletarian. Drop the first and you are on Avaakum’s ground, with the theory of a new class or of state capitalism. Drop the second and you deny the obvious.
The conundrum is a real one, and it deserves a better answer than either the sophistry or the shrug. This article argues three things. The conundrum is older than Workers’ Liberty: Ernest Mandel posed it himself, inside the Fourth International, between 1946 and 1950, in a stronger form than Avaakum did. When the Fourth International changed its mind in 1951, it did so with conditions attached, conditions that later readers, including some of its sharpest critics, dropped. And with those conditions restored and the actors named, the tradition can answer the conundrum without the third premise. China did not need a workers’ party. It needed something else, which can be specified.
Mandel’s objection
In September 1946 Mandel, writing as E. Germain, published “The Soviet Union after the War” in Quatrième Internationale. The SWP’s International Information Bulletin carried it in English the following March. In it he gave a name to a process Trotsky had analysed in eastern Poland in 1939: structural assimilation. The Soviet bureaucracy, he argued, could take lasting control of new territory only by assimilating it to the economic base that came out of October. That might happen gradually, as a tendency, and how far it went would depend on the balance of forces between the bureaucracy and imperialism on one side, and between the bureaucracy and the working class on the other.
He then set a limit. To assimilate a territory completely, to expropriate the landlords and capitalists and destroy them as a class, the bureaucracy would be forced to call on the masses’ own action, however much it tried to control and crush it. Because it feared that action like the plague, he concluded, it would manage assimilation only on a limited scale.
Over the next four years, as the people’s democracies hardened, Mandel defended the view that the buffer states were still capitalist. Tim Wohlforth, who later reconstructed the debate in The Theory of Structural Assimilation, sets out his reasons as four objections.
The masses. In Trotsky’s account of eastern Poland the masses played a part, however limited and controlled. In the buffer zone they played almost none.
Absorption. The only cases where capitalism had been destroyed without the masses were the Baltic states, absorbed into the USSR, where the bourgeoisie could be wiped out by police methods. Outside Soviet borders that was out of the question.
The material base. Small, backward countries had too narrow a base for a workers’ state. At the least, a Balkan federation would be needed.
Lenin’s theory of the state. This was the gravest. Lenin held that a workers’ state is formed by destroying the bourgeois state apparatus and building a new state on the councils the masses create. In Eastern Europe nothing of the kind happened. The councils were crushed in the first phase. The old state machine was purged, flooded with Stalinists and fused with the party, and much of its personnel stayed in place.
Mandel put the fourth objection most sharply in January 1950, in “The Yugoslav Question, the Question of the Soviet Buffer Zone, and Their Implications for Marxist Theory“, his reply to Pablo. What characterises the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state, he wrote, is precisely the claim that a change in the relationship of forces is not enough to change the social nature of the state. Its midwife has to be the destruction of the old state apparatus and the construction of a new one. Those who called the buffer states workers’ states were admitting that the transformation had happened “cold”, without that destruction. And that, he said, was to accept to the letter the Stalinist theory of “New Democracy”, which held that the people’s democracies could pass from capitalism to socialism by the gradual evolution of their state apparatus. The Stalinists at least had the theoretical courage to say so. He added that if the facts compelled a revision of the theory, Marxists would have to make it, however painful. In his view the facts did not yet compel one.
(Wohlforth, summarising the same objection a decade later, compared it to a revision of Lenin on the scale of Bernstein’s revision of Marx. Mandel’s own comparison was with the Stalinists, and it is the more pointed one, since “New Democracy” was the very programme of restabilisation the Communist parties were then pursuing.)
That fourth objection is Avaakum’s conundrum in a stronger form. Avaakum asks how a peasant party could make a workers’ state. Mandel asked how anyone could make a workers’ state without smashing the old one. Wohlforth, writing in the early 1960s, said that nobody in the movement had answered it, Mandel included.
What happened in Eastern Europe
The objection was strong because the facts were awkward. The Kremlin had not set out to abolish capitalism in Eastern Europe. It set out to rebuild it. Wohlforth’s own chapter heading for 1944–47 is “the reconstruction of the bourgeois state structure”. The Red Army arrived, the Communist parties took the police and the interior ministries, and coalition governments kept bourgeois ministers in office. The war had already done most of the destroying: the national bourgeoisies were broken, compromised by collaboration, or gone. What Moscow wanted was a ring of friendly capitalist states that would protect the USSR within an agreement on peaceful coexistence with its wartime allies.
That agreement did not survive 1947. The Marshall Plan offered the governments of Eastern Europe a way back into the American orbit, and the Cold War turned the bourgeois parties still in those coalitions from tame partners into a possible bridgehead for rollback. Between 1947 and 1950 the coalitions were broken up, the bourgeois ministers removed, industry nationalised, and party and state fused. In the Workers Socialist League’s 1978 account of these years, the turning point was exactly that: the realisation in Moscow that bourgeois elements inside these governments could become a rallying point against the Soviet Union.
Two kinds of evidence show that this outcome was not written in advance. One is rollback. Finland and Austria were in the Soviet zone of influence at the end of the war, and neither was assimilated. Both stayed capitalist. The other is a control case, and it is the most instructive of all. In May 1947 the Communist ministers were put out of government in France and in Italy. The French and Italian parties had followed the same strategy as their Eastern European counterparts: coalition with bourgeois parties, reconstruction of the capitalist economy, discipline over the workers in the name of national recovery. The strategy was the same, in East and West. The outcome was opposite. What differed was not the intentions of the Communist parties but the class relation they faced: in the West a bourgeoisie that still existed, backed by the United States; in the East a bourgeoisie the war had destroyed, with the Red Army in the country.
Why Mandel changed his mind
By January 1951 Mandel had changed his mind. His Ten Theses, written for the Third World Congress, accepted that the buffer states had become deformed workers’ states through structural assimilation. His own account of his error is precise and honest. The movement had always held, he wrote, that the bureaucracy wanted to assimilate its buffer zone. The question had been its capacity to do so. The mistaken thesis was that the bureaucracy could not rely on the masses to eliminate the remnants of the bourgeoisie without being outflanked by them. That had happened in only one case, Yugoslavia. Elsewhere the mobilisation of the masses had been so limited, and the workers so passive, that the Kremlin had eliminated the bourgeoisie step by step while keeping the masses under strict control.
He did not concede everything. The ninth thesis insisted that the class nature of a state must be judged from the real class forces at work, not from property relations isolated from their historical origin. The property criterion, however important, did not by itself settle the question. And he described a transitional stage: political power had passed early to the Communist parties, backed by Soviet military and police force, which had then ruled for a whole period without transforming property or the state apparatus. He called these regimes workers’ and peasants’ governments, in the process of turning into deformed workers’ states.
The Third World Congress, in August 1951, heard a report on Eastern Europe from Pierre Frank and adopted a resolution by 41 votes to 2. It said the buffer states were now deformed workers’ states, above all because of their economic base. They had arisen not from the revolutionary action of the masses but from the military-bureaucratic action of the Soviet bureaucracy. The resolution acknowledged that the movement’s earlier caution had been an error, and then made the admission that would be argued over for decades. Revolutionary mass action had turned out not to be an indispensable condition for the bureaucracy to destroy capitalism. The resolution added two qualifications at once: this held in analogous exceptional conditions, and in an international climate like that of the Cold War.
It added a third point that is easy to overlook. Even here the bureaucracy had not done without the masses entirely. It had mobilised them bureaucratically, in committees of various kinds that helped disarm and expropriate the bourgeoisie. It had to, the resolution said, because the bureaucracy is not an independent social force, a class. It leans partly on the proletariat to fight the bourgeoisie, while keeping the masses inside the straitjacket of its police control.
Why did Mandel move? The facts of 1947–50 were the main reason. The process he had said could only go so far had gone all the way. There were also the pressures of the moment: Michel Pablo’s challenge inside the leadership, the shock of the Tito–Stalin split, and an expectation of a third world war that made every question urgent. His later critics put it less kindly. Wohlforth wrote that by 1951 Mandel was too demoralised to answer his own objections. The WSL said in 1978 that he “collapsed in front of Pablo”. Neither judgement is evidence of motive, and both should be read as polemic. The documented reason is the one Mandel gave: the bureaucracy had proved capable of something he had thought it incapable of.
What he did not do was answer his fourth objection. The 1951 resolution states the conclusion. It explains the process. It does not explain how a workers’ state could emerge from a purged and fused bourgeois state apparatus. Wohlforth was right that the question was left open.
Mandel did not drift from the 1951 position afterwards. In his Critique de l’eurocommunisme (1978) he set out his settled view. A bureaucracy whose privileges rest on a mode of production born of the abolition of capitalism can occasionally, and within narrow limits, try to extend its power by extending the zone where that mode of production operates. It did so in 1939–40 in eastern Poland, the Baltic states and Bessarabia, and on a larger scale in 1947–49 across its military glacis in Eastern Europe. Each time it acted by military-bureaucratic means under its own strict control, led no genuine mass revolution, and had first agreed with imperialism on the division of the world into spheres of influence. He expected no repetition in Europe or Asia in the foreseeable future. The exceptions confirmed the rule: the bureaucracy’s foreign policy was counter-revolutionary.
China: the second change of mind
None of this was about China. The 1951 resolution on Eastern Europe lists China separately, beside the USSR and the buffer zone, and does not classify it. The Congress’s own Manifesto was still calling on Chinese workers to complete the destruction of bourgeois power. In January 1951 Mandel described the Chinese regime as a workers’ and peasants’ government. The leader of the French majority, Marcel Bleibtreu, writing against Pablo in June, said the Chinese economy had kept a capitalist structure and that the CCP had stopped being a Stalinist party and become “a centrist party moving forward with the revolution”.
The same Congress adopted a resolution on Yugoslavia that said the Yugoslav experience confirmed the character of the Stalinist parties as degenerated workers’ parties. The category of “workers’ party”, for Communist parties whatever their composition, was official doctrine. What remained was to apply it to China.
Mandel did so in December 1952, in his “Report on the Chinese Question” to the Congress commission, published in the International Information Bulletin. It is the text Avaakum’s footnote is really aimed at, whether or not he had read it.
Peng’s criteria. Peng Shuzhi, a founder of Chinese Trotskyism and of its Fourth International section, had offered, in his report on the Chinese situation, two criteria for a party’s class character: its social composition and the policy it actually pursued. Mandel called these insufficient. Social democracy in France and the Netherlands was mostly petty-bourgeois in membership and bourgeois in policy, yet the movement still called it a degenerated workers’ party, because of its origins in the workers’ movement and its place in society.
His own test. A party’s programme counted at least as much as its composition, and its objective role in society was the decisive criterion.
Applied to the CCP. The CCP was still largely peasant, and its leadership had long collaborated with the bourgeoisie. But it had written the abolition of private property into its statutes. It proclaimed its loyalty to the USSR. In March 1949 it had moved the centre of its work to the cities, and in 1950 it had stopped recruiting peasants. Had anyone ever seen a peasant party do these things?
Against the dual formula. He rejected the earlier description of the CCP as a “workers’ and peasants’ party”. Trotsky, he noted, had condemned the idea of such dual parties.
The objection from 1932. To those who objected that Trotsky had called the CCP a peasant party in 1932, he answered that the present can correct our understanding of the past.
Peng replied in the same bulletin with a sharp point. By Mandel’s criteria, the ultra-left CCP of 1932, with its campaign for soviets and a workers’ and peasants’ government, would have to be called a workers’ party too.
That is the argument the footnote mocks. And the footnote is fair to it. To call a party a workers’ party because of its programme, its loyalty to Moscow and a resolution about recruitment is a way of making the facts fit the conclusion. Peng saw the problem in 1952. Peng also, as Wohlforth later noted, forecast what would actually happen. The CCP would take neither the road of capitalist counter-revolution nor that of proletarian revolution, but a third: the gradual “East-Europeanisation” of China, purging the bourgeois parties from the coalition, expropriating private property step by step, and never loosening its bureaucratic grip on the masses.
The SWP’s version
The American SWP, by then in a separate international faction, took longer and argued differently. Its 1955 resolution, “The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath”, has a sharper sociology than Mandel’s report.
The CCP’s leaders. It described them as declassed petty-bourgeois, with cadres trained in decades of struggle against the permanent revolution. They had withdrawn to the countryside after 1927 and used armed power to rule scattered peasant masses for over twenty years, consolidating there as an uncontrolled bureaucracy.
The masses held back. At every stage of the revolution they had held the masses back. They kept the workers out of the struggle and confined it as far as possible to the military plane.
No overturn in 1949. On taking power the CCP had clung to its bloc of four classes. It broke with capitalism only after American forces drove towards the Yalu and imperialism imposed its blockade.
The conclusion. China was a deformed workers’ state.
At the decisive point, though, the resolution reaches for a phrase rather than an explanation. “The objective dynamics, the inner logic of the struggle against imperialist intervention” forced the bureaucracy to break with capitalism. That is, I argue, not really a Marxist approach. A process does not act. Classes, parties and states act, under pressures that can be named. The resolution’s own materialist explanation comes a page later, and it is better than its phrase. A declassed bureaucracy with no base in production has to secure a monopoly over the disposal of the surplus product if it is to secure its income, power and privileges. That names an actor and an interest.
By 1963 the SWP had simplified further. Its resolution that year said the party had characterised China as a workers’ state “sociologically”, from the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists, the nationalisation of the means of production, the state monopoly of foreign trade and planning. That is Avaakum’s first premise in its plainest form. It is worth noticing what it does not say. It does not claim the CCP was a workers’ party. Avaakum’s conundrum bites on Mandel’s 1952 report. It does not bite on the SWP’s sociology, which has a different weakness: it does not explain the agent at all.
How the WSL ended up agreeing
The Workers Socialist League was founded in October 1975 by Alan Thornett and other militants expelled from Gerry Healy’s WRP, and its founding document, “The Fourth International: Problems and Tasks”, appeared in Trotskyism Today that autumn. It took the 1951 Congress as the point where the Fourth International went wrong. It reported Mandel’s objection from Lenin’s theory of the state, and called the Congress’s admission that the bureaucracy could abolish capitalism without the masses an “empirical recognition” of the facts, the seed of the disorientation that led within two years to Pablo’s liquidationism.
It also misquoted the admission. The WSL’s version has the masses’ action not indispensable for the bureaucracy to destroy capitalism “in exceptional... circumstances”. The ellipsis removes the word “analogous” and the clause about the Cold War. The source the WSL cited, the SWP’s 1969 collection Class, Party and State, reprints the resolution with both qualifications intact. Without them, a statement about one historical situation reads as a general licence, and the “seeds of Pabloism” become easy to find.
Two and a half years later the WSL had moved. In March 1978 Trotskyism Today published a long study, “Aspects of the History of the Fourth International”, and in May the League’s publishing house brought out Wohlforth’s Theory of Structural Assimilation with a preface by John Lister and a critical essay by Adam Westoby. The 1978 article reversed the emphasis of 1975.
Mandel was wrong to look for the masses. His 1946–47 insistence that the masses had to be involved was, it now said, the mistake. He had fastened on one part of Trotsky’s Poland analysis and applied it mechanically. What actually transformed Eastern Europe was not the mobilisation of the masses but the collapse of capitalism, at home and abroad, in the face of the Soviet Union’s threat to act. Mandel’s search for working-class mobilisation was a “dead end”.
Yugoslavia. It fitted the buffer pattern. Workers had occupied factories as the partisans won, and Tito declined to recognise the occupations. The big nationalisations came eighteen months after Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s. When the coalition broke up early, Tito moved quickly to head off the mass movement and keep it inside national borders. By the break with Stalin in 1948 the transformation was almost complete. The split was a clash of national bureaucratic interests, not of revolution against counter-revolution.
China. The CCP had held back the post-war upsurge in Shanghai and elsewhere while it sought a coalition with Chiang. It began its offensive in 1947 only when Chiang moved to destroy it. It won with Soviet help: captured Japanese arms, Manchurian industry disabled before it was returned to Chiang, and an international balance that ruled out American intervention. After 1949 Mao sought a new coalition and kept the old state apparatus, and the transformation came gradually and from above, without the masses. The CCP remained Stalinist throughout.
Wohlforth, meanwhile, had supplied the mechanism. For him the new states were extensions of the degenerated workers’ state that came out of October. Their working-class character came from that origin, not from any role the local working class had played, and they were better called degenerated than deformed. The CCP, so far as it stood independent of China’s own classes, was essentially an extension of the Soviet bureaucracy. And that answered Mandel’s fourth objection. The extension of a degenerated workers’ state into new territory would change the political superstructure least of all, just as, Trotsky had argued in The Revolution Betrayed, a bourgeois restoration in the USSR would have to purge fewer people than a political revolution. The purged and fused state apparatus was not an anomaly. It was what the theory predicted.
So by 1978 the WSL held the 1951 conclusion: capitalism had been abolished in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and China without the masses. It rejected the reasoning the 1951 Congress had given, and it rejected outright the criterion Mandel had started from in 1946. Mandel had moved from “the masses are indispensable” to “not in these conditions”. The WSL had moved from denouncing that concession to holding its substance by another route. The two changes of mind crossed. That same year Mandel’s own account, in his book on Eurocommunism, described the buffer in terms Wohlforth would have recognised: a military-bureaucratic extension, with no mass revolution, within a division of spheres agreed with imperialism.
Not everyone in the WSL’s orbit was satisfied. Westoby’s essay, printed in the League’s own edition of Wohlforth, argued that the theory underestimated the real independence of the Yugoslav and Chinese parties. Tito’s partisans had held territory during the war. Mao’s party had administered a “Soviet Republic” in Kiangsi and then Yenan for twenty years before 1949, a quasi-state with an army and an economy of its own. These bases gave the native Stalinists interests that could not always be reconciled with Kremlin diplomacy. And Wohlforth’s bias, Westoby argued, came from the fight he was in: having accepted Healy’s line that Cuba remained capitalist, he needed to show that capitalism could not be overthrown far from Moscow by movements independent of it.
An answer that needs no workers’ party
With the history set out, the conundrum can be answered. The answer has four steps, and each names an actor.
First, a coalition meant to restabilise capitalism. In every case the party that later expropriated the capitalists began by trying to put capitalism back on its feet. That was true of the people’s democracies of 1944–47, of Mao’s “New Democracy” with its bloc of four classes, and of the French and Italian parties in the same years. The pattern did not die with Stalin. Livio Maitan’s 1977 dissection of the Italian Communist Party’s medium-term programme, a programme that had to win the consent of both classes and so measured everything by its compatibility with capital, describes the same strategy thirty years on. Mandel devoted a chapter of his book on Eurocommunism to the same party as the apostle of austerity.
Second, a class pressure that made restabilisation impossible. A coalition government of this kind, presiding over a bourgeois state while the Communist party holds the police, cannot stand still. It goes forward to expropriation or back to capitalism. Maitan put the general law well in 1977: antagonistic classes, unlike chess players, cannot accept a stalemate as the end of the game, and the only question is which class breaks it. In Eastern Europe the pressure was mainly imperialist. Imperialism played a double part, as Mandel stressed in 1978: it had already conceded the region as a Soviet sphere, which is why it did not intervene, and within that sphere its Cold War pressure made a capitalist buffer a threat to Moscow rather than a safeguard. In China the pressure was the American drive to the Yalu and the blockade. In Yugoslavia it was a partisan war, factory occupations and a coalition that fell apart within months. Where the pressure went the other way, as in Italy and France in 1947, the coalition rolled back to capitalism. Finland and Austria rolled back too.
Trotsky had already analysed a case of this kind. In eastern Poland in 1939 the Kremlin expropriated the landlords and nationalised the means of production as a defensive measure under the threat of war, by bureaucratic-military methods. Counting imperialist pressure among the forces that decide such an outcome is not a revision of Trotsky’s method. It is his method applied to a larger case.
Third, an apparatus that was not a class, forced against its own programme, leaning on the workers. None of these leaderships set out to expropriate the capitalists. They were pushed into it. And to carry it out they had to mobilise the working class, however bureaucratically: committees, militias, campaigns against the capitalists. That is the 1951 resolution’s point, and it is the best part of it. A bureaucracy that is not a class has to borrow the social weight of one.
Fourth, expropriation on the model of the existing workers’ state. The capitalist class was destroyed as a class, not merely stripped of its titles, and the economy reorganised on the only non-capitalist model in existence, inside a bloc that depended on it. A peasant army can destroy an old regime’s armed power. But the peasantry cannot supply a state form of its own. That was Trotsky’s argument, and Mandel restated it in 1952: the parties that rest on the peasantry are either revolutionary workers’ parties or petty-bourgeois parties that end up serving the bourgeoisie. The leadership of a peasant war, with the workers absent, could only build on the Soviet model or hand the country back to capital.
Put the four steps together and Avaakum’s third premise dissolves. The overturn in China needed no workers’ party. It needed a government that could not stay where it was, run by a party whose only non-capitalist model was the Soviet one, under a pressure that ruled out going back. The CCP’s peasant composition is no more an obstacle than the Soviet bureaucracy’s non-proletarian character was in Eastern Europe. The Cuban revolution follows a similar path. The deformation of the result is not an embarrassment to be explained away. It is what the steps predict, and why everyone in this tradition, from the 1951 Congress to the WSL, called for a political revolution.
The steps also answer the bureaucratic collectivist on Avaakum’s side of the argument, who reads the Cold War as a rivalry between two ruling classes and the Kremlin’s expropriations as one of them defending its domain. A ruling class that has to be forced into existence against its own programme, by the failure of the capitalist restoration it was trying to carry out, is an odd sort of class. Stalinism in these countries did not grow out of strata inside them, as a new class would. It spread outward from the USSR, through parties that wanted coexistence with capital until coexistence became impossible. And when the workers of these states rose, in Berlin in 1953 and in Hungary and Poland in 1956, they rose to take control of the property in their name, not to hand it back to its former owners.
What remains hard
The answer is not complete, and an honest one should say where.
In China the workers were deliberately kept out. The 1955 resolution, Wohlforth, Peng and the WSL all agree on that. The working class appears in the Chinese overturn only as the object of a bureaucratic mobilisation against the capitalists in 1951–52. The third step holds there, but thinly.
The CCP had a base of its own for twenty years before it took power. Westoby is right that this gave it interests distinct from Moscow’s, and the 1955 resolution’s account of a bureaucracy consolidated over two decades of armed rule over the peasants points the same way. A bureaucracy with its own army and territory is not simply an extension of the Kremlin. That cuts against Wohlforth, and it also gives Avaakum his best line: something that looks like a ruling group in formation before the overturn, not after.
And the bureaucratic collectivist can still say that a class may form after power is taken, whatever its members intended beforehand. The answer to that is historical rather than logical. These regimes did not stabilise as a new mode of production. They lurched from crisis to crisis, and in the end their rulers turned themselves into a bourgeoisie, which is what a caste does when it loses its footing and what a class with a mode of production of its own should not need to do.
The fault was not Jesuitry
Avaakum’s footnote charges the post-war Trotskyist movement with training its cadres in Jesuitical interpretation. The history does not bear him out, or not in the way he meant. The question he asks was argued in the open, inside the movement, for thirty years. Mandel asked it first and in its strongest form. The 1951 Congress answered part of it and attached conditions to its answer. Peng saw the problem with Mandel’s 1952 solution in the same bulletin in which Mandel proposed it. The SWP and the WSL each tried a different route.
Nor was the method Jesuitical. Pierre Frank, introducing his collected essays on Stalinism in December 1976, put the movement’s own rule plainly. Humanity’s road to socialism had been far more tortuous than anyone since Marx had expected, and Stalinism had done much to make it so. The only way to keep Trotsky’s thought from hardening into frozen dogma was to follow the changes minutely and continue his work with the same method. That is a description of the opposite of Jesuitry. The question is whether the movement always lived up to it.
The fault lay elsewhere. A conclusion was adopted before its strongest objection had been answered, and was then repeated, by supporters and critics alike, without the conditions that made it defensible. Restore the conditions, name the actors, and the conundrum has an answer that needs neither a peasant party that was “really” proletarian nor a new ruling class that nobody set out to create.
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